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Ohio v. American Express:
Misunderstanding Two-Sided
Platforms; the Charge Card
"Market;" and the Need for
Procompetitive Justifications
By Jeffrey L. Harrison*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ohio v. American Express Co.,1 the Supreme Court of the United
States had its first knowing encounter with what it incorrectly viewed as
a two-sided platform 2  in the context of American Express's
Non-Disclosure Provisions (NDP).3 Under these provisions, merchants
accepting the American Express card for payment are not permitted to
inform consumers that other cards charge merchants less for their use
and that this could be reflected in the final price paid.4 The opinion
includes poor reasoning, a lack of attention to precedent, and bad news
for those who thought antitrust law was due for a revival. 5 Yet, and
perhaps surprisingly, the outcome may be correct.
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the antitrust landscape to
provide an understanding of where the practices of American Express fit.
*Huber C. Hurst Eminent Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Florida College
of Law. University of Florida (B.S., 1967; M.B.A., 1968; Ph.D., 1970); University of North
Carolina (J.D., 1978).
1. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
2. See infra discussion at notes 26-34.
3. These provisions prohibited merchants who accepted the American Express card
from informing customers that other cards charged a lower user fee. Am. Express Co., 138
S. Ct. at 2280.
4. Specifically excluded by the NDP was discounting the purchase price based on
using a less expensive card. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 165
(E.D.N.Y. 2015).
5. See infra discussion at Part V.
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Part III discusses the two-sided market issue generally and how it was
treated in American Express specifically. That Part includes an
explanation of why what was involved in American Express was actually
a one-sided market that had been segmented in the interests of price
discrimination. In fact, American Express and its competitors sell a
single product to one group of customers: the right to delay payment to
purchasers of goods and services. Part IV makes the point that the
American Express system shares characteristics of tying, resale price
maintenance, and exclusive dealing.6 That Part also claims that the NDP
share none of the qualities that frequently make those practices lawful.
American Express's activity skirted the edges of several vertical
restraints, and its underlying character restricted interbrand
competition. Part V includes general observations about the case and
suggests the outcome may be correct, but the reasoning employed to get
there is troublesome in that it continues the trend of minimizing the
importance of antitrust law.
Two observations-perhaps assumptions-underlie much of this
analysis. The first, I think, is not controversial. Charge card companies
often require an upfront yearly fee, 7 and they also derive revenue as a
percentage of the sale made using the card.8 This superficially seems like
a charge to the merchant, and it is, but only if narrowly construed. The
transaction charge is no different from any other cost of production. Thus,
transaction-by-transaction charges are accounted for, as much as
possible, in the cost of the product. It is true that it may not be completely
passed through to consumers. That will depend on the elasticity of
demand faced by the merchant. 9 Nevertheless, the idea that the
merchant is a customer that ultimately pays the entire transaction cost
fee is an oversimplification. 10
6. In fact, the Court ignored its own holdings with respect to tying. See infra text
accompanying notes 68-74.
7. Some do not charge a yearly fee. This does not alter the analysis to follow.
8. In the case of true credit cards, income is earned by charging interest on the
outstanding balance.
9. Elasticity refers to the responsiveness of buyers to changes in price. If demand is
inelastic, most or all of the transaction charge will be passed through. If demand is elastic
it will be more difficult to pass through the charge. The point is not that the entire
transaction fee is always passed on, but to the extent it is, the notion of merchants as buyers
seems imprecise.
10. Support for the notion that merchants pass on the transaction cost is the fact that
some merchants were evidently willing to lower prices when lower-cost cards were used.
This is inferred from the fact that American Express specifically prohibited discounting.
Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 165. In addition, merchants are sometimes willing to
offer a discount for cash payments. Id.
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The second point is perhaps more controversial. Throughout the
history of the American Express litigation, American Express and other
charge card companies were described as competing for merchants to
accept their cards. 11 This raises the question of what it means to compete.
In its strongest form, competition has an exclusivity element to it. If you
buy a Ford, you are not buying a Chevrolet. If you choose one brand of
toothbrush, you are not buying another. This is not the case when it
comes to merchants and charge cards. First, they do not buy the cards;
they agree to accept them. Second, they can agree to accept multiple
cards. The real competition in the credit card world is for consumers to
enroll in various credit card programs and to actually use the card in
making purchases. This is not to say that card companies do not want
their cards accepted by as many merchants as possible, but the idea of
"competition" in this context is different from those circumstances in
which a sale by one seller means a lost sale to another.
II. THE CONTEXT
As those involved in antitrust know, there are two types of agreements
to which the antitrust laws apply. 12 One is an agreement between
competitors selling products that are good substitutes for each other.
These are horizontal agreements and some of them are per se unlawful. 13
Both the majority and dissent in American Express recognized that case
as not involving a horizontal agreement. 14 As this analysis demonstrates,
however, the impact on competition was horizontal or interbrand in
nature.
The second type of agreement is vertical in that it involves two firms
in the chain of distribution. They could be a manufacturer and a retailer
or any seller to a reseller. There is an important distinction to be made
within the category of vertical agreements. Some of these agreements
decrease intrabrand, and others decrease interbrand competition. As an
example of the former, the manufacturer of automobiles may assign
geographic areas to each dealership to ensure they do not compete with
11. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2281; United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d
179, 190 (2d Cir. 2015); Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 158.
12. Agreements that restrain competition are unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
13. This means that an actual anticompetitive effect need not be demonstrated. Even
in these cases, though, a defendant may successfully argue that the net effect of an
otherwise per se unlawful agreement is to increase competition. If so, the standard shifts to
the rule of reason. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1984).
14. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284, 2297.
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each other.15 The idea is to give each dealership the maximum incentive
to compete against other brands. To understand why, imagine two
dealerships that are close to each other-Dealer A and Dealer B. Dealer
A may not advertise the brand it sells in hopes that Dealer B will promote
the brand and Dealer A will benefit. In other words, Dealer A may
attempt to free ride. Dealer B may adopt the same strategy with the
outcome that the brand is advertised very little to the disadvantage of
the dealership but, more importantly, to the manufacturer's effort to
compete against other makers of automobiles.
For this analysis, the more important intrabrand restraint is on
price-resale price maintenance. For 100 years, resale price maintenance
was per se unlawful. 16 The standard was changed to the rule of reason
based on the logic that sellers may want to limit price competition when
they believe other forms of competition-quality and service-are more
effective in their interbrand competitive efforts. Generally, the sacrifice
of intrabrand competition, in order to advance interbrand competition, is
found to be legal.17 Nevertheless, it will be argued below that the NDP
have an impact similar to resale price maintenance without any
offsetting, procompetitive benefits. 8
Other vertical agreements directly restrain some interbrand
competition in hopes of increasing other forms of interbrand
competition.' 9 Because the weighing is of opposite interbrand effects,
these agreements are more suspect than those that directly affect
intrabrand competition. The NDP in American Express directly affected
interbrand competition. 20 Some interbrand restraints have only a minor
anticompetitive impact and may, on balance, be squared with increasing
overall interbrand competition. Ideally, those that are condemned are
those in which the negative interbrand effects are more pronounced than
the positive interbrand effects.
For example, a manufacturer of a brand of automobiles may prohibit
its dealerships from buying and reselling all or some other brands of
15. The rule of reason of this practice was established in Continental Television, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 46 (1977).
16. The long-standing rule was changed from per se unlawful to the rule-of-reason
standard in 2007. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007).
17. See generally Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the
21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009); Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints
and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229 (2005).
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 248 (6th ed. 2014).
20. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 208.
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automobiles. These are called exclusive dealerships and operate like
requirements contracts. The dealership must buy all of its cars from one
manufacturer. This forecloses other manufacturers from selling to that
dealership but can be explained by the same argument as in the
interbrand and intrabrand cases. The manufacturers may heavily
promote a particular brand; but, once the customer is on the premises,
the dealer may attempt to sell another brand that is presumably more
profitable. In effect, rather than free ride on other dealers, as in the
interbrand and intrabrand example, the dealership free rides on the
manufacturer. The anticompetitive effects are not that serious unless a
particular manufacturer has imposed this requirement on a substantial
share of possible dealers. If so, the costs of entering the market increases
to new competitors and the net effect is anticompetitive. 21
The other principal vertical interbrand restraint is tying. Tying occurs
when a seller will only sell one product if the buyer also buys another
product. Obviously, the seller must possess market power with respect to
one product if that seller can force the buyer to also purchase a second
product. In antitrust parlance, the product in which there is market
power is called the tying product, and the one attached to it or forced on
the buyer is the tied product. The law on tying is not entirely clear. If one
had to state a black letter rule, it would be that tying is unlawful if the
tying firm sells two products, possesses market power in the tying
product market, and forces buyers to purchase a substantial dollar
volume of the tied product. 22 As of this writing, the soft per se test of tying
seems to prevail, but the drift seems to be toward a rule-of-reason
approach. 23 The harm in a tying case is to consumers who are forced to
buy a product or a brand they do not prefer and to competitors who sell
only the tied product.
In American Express, the Court applied the standard rule-of-reason
analysis. 24 In most cases, the plaintiffs obligation is to define the market
and demonstrate the anticompetitive impact of the practice in question.
This market definition requirement is waived if the negative competitive
effects can be directly shown. 25 If successful, the burden then shifts to the
21. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 19, at 250; see Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
22. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
23. For a discussion, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 447-48
(4th ed. 2011); SULLIvAN & HARRISON, supra note 19, at 271-73.
24. 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
25. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275
F.3d 191, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2001). In dicta, the majority in American Express rejects the
notion that the definition could be dispensed within cases involving vertical restraints. Am.
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7.
2019]
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defendant to demonstrate that the procompetitive effects are stronger
than the anticompetitive effects. If the defendant is successful, the
plaintiff then has an opportunity to show that the same procompetitive
outcome could be achieved by less anticompetitive means.
It is argued below, among other things, that the practices in American
Express are similar to exclusive dealing, tying, and resale price
maintenance, and that interbrand competition is restricted without any
offsetting procompetitive effects. For now, though, this Article turns to
the first step in the rule-of-reason analysis-market definition.
III. MARKET DEFINITION IN AMERICAN EXPRESS
A. The Two-Sided Market Problem Generally
The Court in American Express regarded itself as dealing with a
two-sided platform.26 These are firms that sell in two markets. 27 There
have been various efforts to define when a firm operates a two-sided
platform, but the basics are fairly simple in that the firm sells two
products to two different groups, and the attractiveness to each group
depends on the usual factors-price, quality, and so forth-plus the level
of sales to the other group. 28 There are many examples of firms operating
two-sided platforms, including Uber; Ebay; Open Table; Scholastica;
self-publishing companies; real estate listing services; and, according to
the Court (arguably incorrectly), credit card companies. 29
In a two-sided market, the demand for product A depends not just on
the price charged in market A but on the demand for market B.
Additionally, demand in market B will depend on price in market B and
the demand in market A. Rochet and Tirole offer the example of video
games. 30 People want to buy gaming platforms that have many games.
Those who produce the games themselves want to write programs for
platforms that have many owners. 31 Evans and Schmalensee use the
26. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2297.
27. See generally David Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms
Operate Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 667 (2005); Patrick Ward, Testing
for Multisided Platform Effects in Antitrust Market Definition, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2059
(2017).
28. It may be that the price to one side of the market is zero, but the demand even at
that price will still be determined by the demand on the other side of the market.
29. See infra text at notes 62-66.
30. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,
1 J. EuR. ECON. ASS'N 990 (2003).
31. Id.
442 [Vol. 70
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example of Open Table, an online reservation system. 32 Restaurants find
it more attractive to be listed as a participating restaurant if there are
many diners using the service. The number of diners using the service
depends on the number and variety of restaurants listed. 33 The Court in
American Express, as well as others, held that credit cards constitute a
two-sided market. 34 Consumers will be attracted to cards that are
accepted by a large number of merchants, and merchants are more likely
to accept cards that are possessed by many consumers.
The problem arises when a firm takes what is arguably
anticompetitive action in market A that causes demand to increase in
market B. Market A's customers may be worse off, and, examined alone,
the practice might be condemned. On the other hand, the practice could
make customers in market B better off. Now the issue arises of how to
define the market, a process that is required in all but a few categories
of antitrust cases. Should the relevant market be the one directly
affected, or should there be an effort to define the market so that it
includes consideration of the net pro or anticompetitive effects?
B. Market Definition in American Express
As noted, American Express required merchants accepting its card to
agree to its Non-Discrimination Provisions. 35 Under these provisions,
merchants were not permitted to do any of the following: "(1) offern
customers any discounts or nonmonetary incentives to use credit cards
less costly for merchants to accept, (2) express[] preferences for any card,
or (3) disclos[e] information about the costs of different cards to
merchants who accept them."36 The trial court and the appellate court
agreed that American Express operated in a two-sided market.3 7 These
two sides were "a market for card issuance, in which Amex and Discover
compete with thousands of Visa- and MasterCard-issuing banks; and a
network services market, in which Visa, MasterCard, Amex, and
Discover compete to sell acceptance services." 38 In this case, the second
market denoted "competition" for merchants to accept the various cards.
32. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided
Platform Businesses, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 404, 409 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014).
33. Id.
34. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280; see also Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 32;
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 30.
35. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 191.
36. Id. at 184.
37. Id. at 185; Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151.
38. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 192; see also Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151.
2019] 443
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The trial court found that the relevant market was for "network services,"
that American Express possessed market power in the relevant market,
and that the NDP had a negative effect on interbrand competition.
39
According to the court, "American Express's ability to impose significant
price increases .. .between 2005 and 2010 without any meaningful...
attrition is compelling evidence of . . . power in the network services
market."40
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on
the basis of the market definition. 41 It adopted the view that the relevant
market was composed of both sales of the cards to cardholders and
competition among card companies for merchants to accept payment
cards.42 One side of the market depended on the charge to merchants
when the card was used. The other side depended on the net charge to
cardholders when the card was issued. This latter cost has two
components, one is the actual issuing fee; the other is rewards which
offset the issuing fee. According to the court, American Express could
increase the number of cardholders by lowering the cost of issuing the
card or by offering more generous rewards. 43 The court further reasoned
that if merchants were insensitive to an increase in fees at the point of
the sale, as the trial court found, that might not be the result of market
power. 44 Instead, it could be the result of American Express making its
card more attractive to cardholders by decreasing enrollment fees or
increasing rewards. This made the card more attractive to consumers,
which, in turn, made accepting the card more attractive to merchants.45
The Supreme Court of the United States, with Justice Thomas writing
for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit.46 Like the
Second Circuit, Justice Thomas reasoned that the actual market was
neither composed of merchants alone nor cardholders alone. 47 Instead,
the market centered around transactions. 48 According to Justice Thomas,
"[F]or credit cards, the network can sell its services only if a merchant
and a cardholder both simultaneously choose to use the network." 49 In
39. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 151.
40. Id. at 188.
41. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 197.
42. Id. at 196-97.
43. Id. at 200.
44. Id. at 202-03.
45. Id. at 203.
46. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2290.
47. Id. at 2280.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2286.
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effect, the majority viewed the product sold to merchants and the product
sold to cardholders as the same based on the number of "transactions."50
Justice Thomas distinguished the case of credit cards from that of
newspapers. 51 Newspapers are, in a sense, two-sided platforms in that
they sell to readers and to advertisers. Advertisers will pay more
depending on the number of likely readers. He reasoned, however, that
readers were largely unconcerned with the quantity of advertising. 52 In
short, the demand for newspapers is independent of the amount of
advertising contained. 53 This indicates that a critical element in
determining whether the market definition must encompass the platform
as a whole is the interdependence of the two products. Just how strong
that interdependence must be is left undetermined.
Although technically the decision was based solely on the failure by
plaintiffs to properly define the market, there appears to be an
underlying rationale of protecting interbrand competition. In this regard,
Justice Thomas's reasoning seems irreconcilable with the very basics of
antitrust policy. According to Justice Thomas, if a merchant is permitted
to suggest a lower cost alternative, the consumer may feel the card is
unwelcome.5 4 This could affect the reputation of the card more generally
and undermine its competitiveness in the market for cardholders. The
essence of the argument is that giving cardholders more information at
the point of the transaction with a merchant could make American
Express unable to compete with other charge cards.
Justice Thomas's rationale seems to be that American Express has
chosen to compete in the market for cards by offering greater rewards. It
cannot do this if faced with greater competition with respect to fees
charged at the point of sale. It is hard to distinguish this from an
argument that to subsidize its competitive efforts in the card market,
American Express must be permitted to retard competition at the point
of sale. This misses two points. First, if American Express cannot be
viable in the card market without the NDP, the competitive solution is to
change its strategy. Second, as discussed below, both charges are
ultimately to the cardholder, and the total cost of the card is a
50. Id. at 2287.
51. Id. at 2286.
52. Id.
53. This may be true in the traditional sense of newspapers, but there exist a wide
variety of newspaper-like publications in which the relationship between the two
products-advertising and access to advertisements-fits the description of a two-sided
market.
54. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289.
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combination of the two types of payments. 55 The NDP created a barrier
to allowing cardholders to react to the total charge.
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the four dissenters. He took a
practical view and asked how the decision to treat a two-sided market as
a single market was useful with respect to the purpose of market
definitions in antitrust cases. 56 He noted that two-sided platforms have
four characteristics: "(1) [they] offer different products or services, (2) to
different groups of customers, (3) whom the 'platform' connects, (4) in
simultaneous transactions."
57
Justice Breyer went on to note that the first two characteristics hardly
called for a special market definition given that many firms sell two or
more products to two or more groups of customers. 58 He also argued that
firms connecting two groups of customers who make simultaneous
transactions are commonplace and gave the examples of farmers'
markets and travel agents. 59 He concluded, "[N]othing in antitrust
law . . . suggests that a court, when presented with an agreement that
restricts competition in any one of the markets my examples suggest,
should abandon traditional market- definition approaches.
' 6 °
C. American Express: Price Discrimination in a Single Market
American Express and other credit card companies have devised a
clever system to promote price discrimination, which the Supreme Court
did not recognize. 61 The first step in understanding this is to note that
American Express is not a two-platform system. American Express, like
all charge card companies, sells a single product to consumers-
convenient, delayed payment opportunities. The revenue it generates
comes from cardholders, first in the form of yearly enrollment fees for the
cards, then as a per-use fee based on the percentage of the amount
charged.62 Rewards programs are simply discounts from these two types
of charges. Competition among companies is for consumers to become
their cardholders and, more importantly, to use the cards.
Obviously, firms that practice price discrimination find it more
profitable to charge different prices to different groups of consumers or
55. See infra text accompanying notes 60-68.
56. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2298.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2299.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2283 (majority opinion).
62. Purchase of the card itself and then the use of the card are regarded as "two
moments of truth" in the industry. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
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individuals as opposed to a single price for all. The key is to charge a
higher price to those willing to pay a higher price and to charge a lower
price to those only willing to pay a lower price (as long as that lower price
is above cost). A good example is movie theaters. They could set a price
of $10 for all times and groups. The problem is that some people with
inelastic demand curves might be willing to pay more. On the other hand,
some other groups-students and the elderly-may not be willing and
able to pay $10, but they would still pay a price that is above the theater's
cost. As long as students and the elderly cannot resell their tickets to
those who would be willing and able to pay more, the two-price system
will be more profitable than the one-price system. The same is true for
airlines that may charge less for those who have flexible schedules as
opposed to business travel, which is likely to be less flexible and harder
to plan in advance. In an ideal world, from the seller's point of view, it
would be best to charge each person a different price based on his or her
willingness to pay.63
In the case of charge cards, it would be possible to sell the cards for
one flat fee and allow buyers to use them on an unlimited basis. That
price would be acceptable to some, particularly those who plan to make
frequent use of the card, but too high for others who see themselves as
rarely using the card. A better outcome is to gauge how important the
card is to different people and accordingly charge different prices to
different groups. This is accomplished through a flat fee minus rewards,
plus a percentage based on the prices of items acquired by using the card.
Again, this is not a two-platform market, but a single market with
discriminatory pricing.64
It is not clear that price discrimination, as practiced by American
Express, should be illegal. In some cases, price discrimination does harm
competition. 65 For example, a firm might sell to a large reseller at one
price and a small reseller at another price making it impossible for the
smaller competitor to survive.66 To some extent, price discrimination as
practiced by American Express may mean increased output as opposed
63. This would be called "perfect price discrimination."
64. American Express also discriminates based on the type of merchant. Am. Express
Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 159.
65. It does, however, mean that consumer surplus is converted to producers' surplus.
See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 19, at 418. In the past some forms of price
discrimination were unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(1) (2018). In
recent years, the reach of the Act has been greatly reduced. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra
note 19, at 413-43. The Act applies to "commodities" and would not apply to the practices
of American Express in any case.
66. The original intent of the Robinson-Patman Act was to avoid this type of outcome.
SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 19, at 420.
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to the outcome if there were one high and flat fee for the card. Given the
possibility that price discrimination as practiced by American Express is
actually welfare increasing, the question is whether NDP are necessary
to achieve this end. Obviously, nothing about them facilitates welfare
enhancing price discrimination. This leaves open the issue of whether
they should be found to be unlawful on other bases.
IV. NDP AS A VERTICAL RESTRAINT
In practice, the NDP resemble a number of questionable practices
described at the outset of this discussion. They can be viewed as leading
to tying-like effects, resale price maintenance, and exclusive dealing.
Each of these is examined below. The critical question is whether any of
the procompetitive rationales for allowing these restraints to exist apply
in the case of American Express. They do not.
A. Passive Tying
It is important to recall that tying has an impact on both competitors
selling the tied product and on customers who are forced to make choices
they would not make in absence of the tie. Although not tying in the
traditional sense, the NDP have the same effect. Possessing the card does
not mean one must use it, but the NDP make it more likely that a
consumer will use it. In fact, buyers who possess the card, if given full
information about the cost per transaction, which ultimately is reflected
in the price paid for goods and services, may choose to use a card that
results in lower costs. 6 7 At the point of purchase, the transaction cost to
the consumer of knowing the cost of the alternatives is high. Yet, for the
merchant it is zero, and divulging the information would make one party,
maybe both, better off. The tie results because the lower-cost provider of
information is prohibited from providing it. It is true that this may make
American Express worse off, but this is a problem only if we want to
reward American Express for avoiding competition on the merits.
An example may be useful. Suppose the customer approaches the
cashier with a $1000 television. If the American Express card is used, the
merchant pays $40 to American Express. If another card is used, the cost
to the merchant might be $20, and the merchant may be willing to lower
the price of the television to $990 if that alternative card is used. If the
customer opts for the lower price, both the merchant and the customer
are better off. The customer technically still has the choice of the lower- or
higher-cost card but is more or less locked into the American Express
67. They may still choose to use the card because they prefer the points as opposed to
a possibly lower price.
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card, unless he or she can be made aware of the benefits of switching to
an alternative to American Express. Those costs of acquiring that
information could be eliminated on the spot by the merchant providing
the information that would allow the consumer to make the choice.
Granted, there is no "forcing" as required in an ordinary tying
arrangement, but ultimately, all ties are the result of raising the cost to
buyers making a different decision, and the NDP do exactly that.
This idea of a transaction-cost-based tie is well-traveled ground by the
Supreme Court. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,68 the
defendant sold copying machines. It did not possess market power in the
copying machine market. It also made replacement parts available but
did not sell them to independent service organizations. 69 This made it
difficult for independent service organizations to compete with Kodak's
servicing. The plaintiffs-independent service organizations-claimed
that Kodak had tied parts and services. The parts were the tying product,
which, if desired, had to be purchased along with Kodak's service. The
defendants argued that it could not have power in the parts market
because it did not possess market power in the photocopier market. 70 In
more general terms, it could not have power in the aftermarket for parts
if it did not possess power in the primary market. The reasoning was that
customers could switch to other copiers if they were dissatisfied with
Kodak's service. 71 The Supreme Court rejected this argument based on a
transaction-costs analysis. 72 In order for the defendant's theory to work,
buyers of the photocopying machines would have to engage in life-cycle
pricing at the outset, meaning that they would purchase based on the
cost of the machine, including servicing over its lifetime. 73 Or, when they
became dissatisfied with Kodak's service they would have to absorb
switching costs. 74 Both options entailed transaction costs associated with
gathering information.
In American Express, people paid a flat fee to possess a charge card,
and, when they presented it, they were charged on a per-use basis. But
for the transaction cost of knowing that the use of another card could be
less expensive to them or the merchant, some customers are likely to
switch. If the same practice in American Express were at issue in the
photocopier case, it would be comparable to Kodak purposely concealing
68. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
69. Id. at 458.
70. Id. at 460.
71. Id. at 465-66.
72. Id. at 470-71.
73. Id. at 473.
74. Id. at 476.
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the information necessary to make life-cycle price calculations or to
accurately determine switching costs.
Again, the tying-like character involved in American Express does not
meet all of the technical requirements of a successful tying claim. People
who present their American Express cards at the point of sale do not
experience a sense of being forced to make a decision to use the American
Express card-possessing the card does not mean it must be used. On the
other hand, the NDP cleverly shelters them from information that would
make alternative cards more attractive. In short, American Express can
charge merchants, and thus, the purchasers to whom the costs are passed
on, more than other cards, because, as in Eastman Kodak Co.,
information about alternatives is unobtainable.
If the NDP result in a soft or passive tie, it is instructive to explore
whether their imposition can be supported by the arguments made for
not finding tying unlawful. One argument is that very often what appears
to be two products should be viewed as one for antitrust purposes. Selling
the two products together is more efficient and likely to lead to lower
prices for consumers. 75 An additional important argument is that tying
cannot lead to increased monopoly profits. This does not mean it is not
more profitable, but that whatever profits are increased cannot be traced
to possession of power in the tying product. This is sometimes called the
single monopoly profit theory.7 6 The idea is that a seller who possesses
market power in one market can simply raise the price of the product and
reap any possible monopoly prices. If consumers are forced to buy a
product as a condition of getting the product in which there is market
power, it is comparable to raising the price of the tying product above the
profit-maximizing price. 77 Thus, whatever the impact on consumers of
the tying arrangement, it cannot be that it increases monopoly profit. 78
In the case of American Express, neither of these justifications hold.
There is no basis to believe that acquiring the card and using it is more
or less efficient than using any other card or paying cash. In addition, the
subtle tie advances the goal of price discrimination, and this does
increase monopoly profits.
75. This economically oriented approach to determining whether one or two products
are involved is an important element of the dissent in Jefferson Parrish Hospital v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 35 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. See generally Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, Robert Bork's Contribution
to Antitrust Perspectives on Tying Behavior, 57 J.L. & ECON. S121 (2004); Einer Elhauge,
Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 397 (2009).
77. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 35-36.
78. This changes if the tying firm is able to establish market power in the tied-product
market.
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B. NDP as Resale Price Maintenance
American Express's practice also bears a resemblance to resale price
maintenance but with a kicker. Typically, resale maintenance prevents
a reseller from selling the relevant product at below what the
manufacturer has indicated. When a transaction involves the use of a
charge card, the cardholder buys three items: a good or a service, possible
rewards, and the option to delay payment. The cost of the second and
third items are covered by the 4% charge by American Express, which is
technically paid by the merchant but almost certainly passed on to the
consumer, as much as possible, like any other cost. American Express
fixes the price of selling the delayed payment, an element of the product.
The kicker is that the merchant is not only prevented from lowering the
4% charge for delayed payment, but they may not suggest a lower cost
alternative.
To understand how this works, in a typical case of resale price
maintenance, a retailer may not be permitted to lower the price of a
product-say a television-to which the manufacturer has affixed a
minimum price. Nevertheless, nothing about the resale price
maintenance prevents the retailer from carrying a competing line of
televisions and showing those competing products to the consumer. Thus,
in the usual case, resale price maintenance means the seller will not be
undercut by a seller of the same brand. In American Express, the impact
is much more serious. It limits competition not just among those
merchants accepting the American Express card, but it limits interbrand
competition among all cards as well.
For example, suppose the seller of televisions in the example above
carries televisions with warranties of varying lengths. Suppose further
that a manufacturer of a specific brand of televisions decides its principal
sales strategy is to offer a two-year warranty. It sets the resale price at
$1000, which reflects the warranty and that the reseller need not worry
about price competition of competing sellers of that brand of television.
Other manufacturers offer a one-year warranty, and the retail price-
whether fixed or not-is lower. The consumer can choose one or the other,
and the practice of fixing the resale price of the televisions with a
two-year warranty reflects the judgment of the manufacturer that
competition on warranty length is more productive than price
competition. The NDP of American Express are comparable to restricting
the store to selling only two-year-warranty televisions. Rather than
restrict intrabrand competition, it crosses over to interbrand competition.
Based on his reasoning in American Express, Justice Thomas might
respond to this line of reasoning by making the point that restricting
merchants from carrying televisions with less than a two-year warranty
increases the prospects for the manufacturer. It does not do this by
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convincing customers that the two-year warranty is worth it. Instead, it
does so by requiring the merchant to raise the transaction costs to
consumers who now must go to other stores to make comparisons.
Similarly, if American Express experiences interbrand success, it is not
on the merits of a superior rewards program. It is because it has been
permitted to raise the transaction cost of finding lower prices. In fact,
Justice Thomas's use of an increase in interbrand competition as a
justification falls well short of making economic sense. He is really
writing about the survival of American Express and the protection of a
competitor as opposed to competition. This protection comes at a cost to
cardholders. In fact, what he seems to support is actually a subsidy from
cardholders to American Express. The broader point is that whatever the
procompetitive justifications for resale price maintenance, they do not
apply to the NDP.
C. NDP as Exclusive Dealing
As noted in Part II, exclusive dealing occurs when a manufacturer
requires its resellers to deal only in products of that manufacturer. As
with the above analysis of tying, the activity of American Express does
not quite fit the model but indirectly has an exclusive dealing-like effect.
Obviously, American Express does not require merchants who accept the
American Express card not to accept any others, at least initially.
Nevertheless, once a buyer pulls his or her American Express card out of
a wallet or purse, the merchant (who again is selling, along with the
product, the opportunity for delayed payment) becomes, at that point, an
exclusive dealer. Again, using the analogy to a storeowner selling various
brands of televisions, the NDP are comparable to a requirement that once
a consumer has shown an interest in one brand of television, the store
owner is prevented from showing a lower cost alternative.
The principal anticompetitive impact of exclusive dealing is that the
manufacturer may foreclose other manufacturers from access to
resellers, and thus, raise entry costs. The principal procompetitive
argument is that it promotes interbrand competition. The idea is that if
the reseller is restricted to one brand, it will make its best efforts to
promote and sell that brand. In addition, it limits free riding by the
reseller on the manufacturer's interbrand promotional efforts.79 Like
tying, exclusive dealing limits interbrand competition, and this
limitation is supposedly offset by increased interbrand competition.
79. The danger is that the manufacturer's advertising would attract the consumer to a
store carrying that brand. The reseller would then switch the consumer to another brand.
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In the context of NDP, this rationale makes little sense. In the case of
American Express, the anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing at the
transactional level would have to be offset by greater competition with
respect to market for enrollment in card programs. The problem is that
card enrollment is based on the net cost of the card---enrollment fee
minus rewards. Rewards, though, are based on card usage. Since rewards
are simply a discount from the price of the card, what the prospective
cardholder receives is largely determined by how much the card is used,
which, in turn, is determined by the cardholder. The idea that less
competition in one interbrand market creates more competition in
another interbrand market makes little sense when the buyer's own
actions determine how attractive the interbrand market is.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The discussion above demonstrates that the market at issue in
American Express was not two sided. This one-sided market was
composed of the sale of or enrollment in credit card programs and
per-transaction user fees, both ultimately paid for by consumers. It
illustrates that American Express and other charge card companies
engage in price discrimination. Although price discrimination can
increase overall welfare, the NDP are unnecessary to achieve that end.
It also shows that the NDP have a negative impact similar to tying, resale
price maintenance, and exclusive dealing. On the other hand, they share
none of the competition-enhancing effects of those restraints.
Both the majority and dissent in American Express misconstrued the
market as two sided. If the market had been defined correctly, the issue
would have been whether American Express possessed market power in
the credit card market with the focus solely on users of the card and
revenue generated by the sale and use of the cards. This would have been
determined by assessing the total revenue from all sources generated by
American Express cards as a percentage of revenue generated by all
charge cards. To be clear, there are certain things this is not. For
example, the majority notes that Visa and MasterCard account for 432
million cards and American Express only 53 million.8 0 Although this
80. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2282. The number of cards in circulation appears to
depend on who you ask. One source puts the total number of cards at 633 million with
American Express issuing 47.5 million. Alina Comoreanu, Market Share by Credit Card
Network, WALLETHUB (Mar. 7, 2017), https://wallethub.com/edu/market-share-by-credit-
card-network25531/. Another source put the total number of American Express cards at
54.9 million with the total for the U.S. at 500 million. But this did not include the number
of Discover Cards, which, based on the first source listed above, was around 50 million.
Tamara E. Holmes, Credit Card Market Share Statistics, CREDIT CARDS,
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seems to be inconsistent with market power, it does not account for actual
revenue generated and, appropriately, the majority does not use it as an
indicator of market power. The problem is that American Express's low
proportion of cards will be offset by their higher price, both for enrolling
and per transaction. Also not a true measure of market power, as the
majority suggests, is the volume of transactions.8 1 Some cards may
consistently generate more revenue per transaction than others and this
seems likely to be the case with American Express. One other measure
that would not capture market share is "credit purchase volume."8 2 How
much people actually spend using credits cards is not a measure of sales
of a specific credit card.8 3 Similarly, simply examining the number of
times American Express raised merchant fees is not, as the dissent
argues, an indicator of market power.8 4 Raising merchant fees might be
offset by increasing rewards, meaning the actual impact that using the
card has on price is unknown. In fact, unless this researcher has
misinterpreted the various descriptions given by the courts, including the
Supreme Court, it is not obvious that a correct market share was ever
generated.
Consequently, the result in American Express may or may not be
correct. As already noted, there are many aspects of the NDP that are
anticompetitive, and there appear to be no procompetitive justifications.
Without a correct assessment of market power, it cannot be determined
if these practices actually harmed competition. Nevertheless, suppose
the outcome is correct; is there anything to concern those interested in a
strong antitrust policy? In fact, correct outcomes justified by poor
reasoning may be just as troublesome as wrong outcomes. This is true of
the majority opinion in American Express. For example, in a footnote,
Justice Thomas attempts to make the already difficult path for the
plaintiffs in vertical-restraints cases even steeper.8 5 It has been standard
antitrust law that one could demonstrate market power by defining the
market and determining the defendant's market share; or, power could
be shown directly by showing the defendant has done things that could
https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/market-share-statistics.php#5-visa-2014
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
81. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
82. See Holmes, supra note 80.
83. One source indicates that American Express has 23% of network purchase volume.
Comoreanu, supra note 80.
84. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2296-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, in
dissent, Justice Breyer mistakenly assumes that a customer is billed for the price of "goods
and services." Id. at 2291. In fact, the customer's bill also reflects some, or the entire,
transaction fee.
85. Id. at 2285 n.7 (majority opinion).
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only be accomplished if it had market power.8 6 For reasons evidently
unrelated to the issue of market power as perceived in the case, Justice
Thomas wrote that the direct proof of market power is not available in
cases involving vertical restraints because "[v]ertical restraints often
pose no risk to competition."87 The logic of his approach is not evident.
The market power step is but one in the analysis of vertical restraints.
Even if relying on direct evidence of anticompetitive effects were a
mistake, a court still must weigh any anticompetitive effects against
procompetitive justifications. In short, the risk of what is known in
antitrust as "false positive" is minimal.88
More worrisome is Justice Thomas's view of what makes markets more
competitive. He writes that a merchant trying to switch the customers to
a lower-cost card will make those customers feel unwelcome.8 9
Unwelcomeness means a loss of customers and the possible eventual
collapse of American Express.90 This house of cards rests on two shaky
assumptions. The first is the very awkward proposition that people will
be offended if informed that a lower cost may be available or that they
can lower the costs to the merchant by using a different card. For the
most part, one of the underlying assumptions of antitrust and economics
is generally that, all other factors held equal, buyers prefer lower prices.
Even if the price of the good being purchased is not lower, there is no
good reason to believe that buyers desire to run up the costs of sellers.
The second, as already noted, is that the antitrust law protects
competitors and not competition, when just the opposite is true.91 This
suggests a serious misunderstanding of antitrust law or a continuation
of the shift in the law to weaken antitrust enforcement.
86. Id. at 2284.
87. Id. at 2285 n.7.
88. A false positive occurs when a practice is condemned under the antitrust law that
actually did not have a negative effect on competition.
89. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289-90.
90. The theory is that having switched away from American Express at one merchant,
the cardholder may do the same at others even if not encouraged to do so. American Express
Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 155.
91. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990). This point is
made by Justice Breyer in dissent. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2303 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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